The concept of specificity is often referred to in the linguistic literature. However, the precise definition of the term is unclear. The specific-nonspecific contrast is sometimes claimed to be semantic in nature, and sometimes, pragmatic. Under the semantics approach, specificity is often essentially treated as scope (Karttunen (1976), Farkas (2002), among others). Under an alternative pragmatic approach (Groenendijk and Stokhof (1980)), the crucial component of specificity is identifiability to the speaker. Thus, the referent of a specific NP is identifiable to the speaker, whereas the referent of a non-specific NP is not. Specificity is analyzed as a pragmatic concept, which affects the way a sentence is interpreted, but does not contribute to its truth conditions.

In this talk, I will focus on the latter, pragmatic, approach to specificity. I argue that the notion of speaker identifiability is linguistically relevant and should be reflected in an adequate representation of the context. I bring evidence in favor of this approach, coming from the interpretational properties of certain lexical items in Russian. In particular, I will discuss the semantic and pragmatic behavior of the so-called -to items, lexical items that contain the suffix -to, such as kakoj-to (some), kto-to (someone), etc, and koje- items (e.g. koje-kakoj (some, a certain), koje-kto (somebody)). -to items strongly tend to take wide scope. Thus, (1) can only mean that there is a student whom Dima failed to notice. However, despite their strong preference for wide scope interpretation, -to items consistently have a referent that is not identifiable to the speaker. Hence the strangeness of such sentences as (2). This sentence suggests that the speaker wants to marry a particular Swede (the narrow scope reading, which could be translated as any Swede, is ruled out, as it is not allowed by the -to item), without knowing who that Swede is. In turn, koje- items, under the usage to be discussed in the talk, are inherently specified as speaker identifiable. Thus, (3) is infelicitous since it asserts that Ivan's spouse is not identified by the speaker, while the koje- item contributes the opposite information. The properties of these items thus demonstrate that language is sensitive to speaker identifiability.

I will then provide a formal analysis of specificity as speaker identifiability. In order to distinguish speaker's knowledge from knowledge of other discourse participants, I will use the notion of the speaker's private context set (PCS), a set of possible worlds that conform to the speaker's beliefs. (This term is based on the notion of an individual's context set, a set f worlds that conform to one's public beliefs, introduced by Gunlogson (2001).)

The formal analysis of speaker identifiability that I propose is provided in (4). According to this analysis, an NP is speaker identifiable if there is an individual that constitutes its referent in every possible world that belongs to the speaker’s PCS. If the speaker identifies the referent as a particular individual, say, a, then a will have the properties ascribed to the referent in every world that is compatible with her beliefs. In turn, an NP is not speaker identifiable if the speaker is not committed that it has a referent, or if she is committed to its existence but is unable to identify it, as represented in (5). For instance, if the speaker utters (6) having in mind Primavera, Primavera will be a picture that fell off the wall in every possible world that is compatible with the speaker’s beliefs. In contrast, if the speaker cannot identify the picture, in every possible world in her PCS there will be a picture that fell off the wall, but in one world this may be Primavera, in another, Portrait of a Lady, in the third one, Mona Lisa, etc. Thus, speaker identifiability is represented as a condition on the relative scope of the existential operator that binds the NP in question and the universal quantifier that is contributed by the context and that quantifies over possible worlds in the speaker’s PCS.

Finally, I will propose a formal analysis of -to and koje- items. I will also argue that the (non-)identifiability component they contribute constitutes a conventional implicature. The conclusion is based, among other factors, on the fact that this component is lexical, not cancelable, does not affect the truth conditions and is not part of common ground.

1. Dima ne zametil kakogo-to studenta.
   Dima NEG noticed some student
   There is a student that Dima didn’t notice.
2. #Ja xoču vytiži zamuž za kakogo-to šveda.
   I want marry(inf) to some Swede
   I want to marry some Swede.
3. Ivan [koje na kom] ženilsja; #ponjatija ne imeju, na kom imenno.
   Ivan has married someone; I have no idea, who exactly.

4. $\exists y \forall w [w \in PCS_A \rightarrow (P(y,w) \land Q(y,w))]$
   (where A is the speaker, P is the property contributed by the content of the NP, and Q is the other property ascribed to the referent of the NP in the sentence. If the NP in question functions as the subject, then Q is the property contributed by the VP.)

5. $\forall w [w \in PCS_A \rightarrow \exists y (P(y,w) \land Q(y,w))]$

6. A picture is missing from the gallery.

References:


